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INTRODUcnON INTRODUCIION
The The OccUpatiODai Safety Safety and and Health Health (OSH) (OSH) Act Act of of 1970 1970 provides provides for for safe:y safe~y regulation regulation of of 5 5 million million workplaces Occupational workplaces. This This law law is is one one of of the the many many new new types types of of regulation regulation introduced introduced in in the the 1970s 1970s to to regulate regulate the the economy economy on on a a nationWIde basis. basis. A A major major problem problem nationwide that that hintJers policy policy makers makers is is the the effective effective enforcement enforcement of of such such regulation. regulation. Enforcement Enforcement of of the the act act is is the the hinders responsibility responsibility of of the initial initial and and reinspection reinspection programs programs whereas whereas in in the the Etamum (1973, study study oy oy Gleason Gleason and and Barnum (197S~ for for example, example, only only initial initial inspections inspections are are considered. considered. Second, Second, this this confutes penalized, model model confmes violations violations to to those those that that are are penalized.
fib-m not not total total violations. violations. When When a a fIrm expects expects with with great great certainty certainty to to be be found found in in violation violation but but not not penalized, penalized, it it has has less less incentive incentive to to consider consider correction. correction. Third, Third, this this paper paper does does not not consider consider the the impact impact of of OSHA OSHA on on injury injury rates. addition, able able incre,lse information information on on to to OSHA OSHA would would have have the the power power to to increase increase both both the the market market wages wages and and the the costs costs of of firms. firms. The The opposite opposite conclusion conclusion is is found found by by Viscusi: Viscusi: as as OSHA OSHA increases increases the the control control efforts of of firms. firms. workers workers decrease decrease their their level level of of eflorts personal personal control. control. This This cOP-elusion leads leads Viscusi Viscusi to to ahe following following policy policy consideration: consideration: there there is is a a danger danger that that stringent stringent enforcement enforcement may may increase increase work work hazards hazards conclusion the because because 01 decreases decreases in in the the personal personal control control efforts of ol elTortsor workers. workers. This paper's condu~ion is is quite quite different: different: if 1 his paper's conclusion il OSHA OSHA is is to to increase increase injury injury control. it it must must increase increase its its level level of of enforcement. enforcement.
control,
The The other other major major difference between between this this paper paper and and 
Together Together ~he information information gathering gathering and and penalizing penalizing powers powers of ofagencies agencies lead lead to to potential potential costs costs to to violators. violators. Both Both activities activities are are needed needed to togenerate generate an an expected expected loss loss for for a a firm firm out out of of compliance compliance with with various various rules. rules. For For the exampk. If a a regulated regulated firm firm expects expects with with great great example. d certainty certainty lO be be found found in in violation violation but but not not penalized penalized to for for a a violation. it it will will have have less less incentive incentive to to correct correct the the violation, violation. violation. When When applied applied in in combination. the the IOSpec combination, ~ospection tion and and penalizing penalizing ,h l;vities determine determine whether whether it it ai Cvities "pays" for for lirm~ to to comply comply with with rules. rules.
"pays" lirmr
A A description description of of the the cost cost function for for the the firm firm in in lirnction some state state of of noncompliance noncompliance is is sclole ci = C(a!, i',, li, x, pi)
where where c, C', = = expected expected cost cost in in dollars dollars for for violation violation of of
2, *-a,q probability probability that that OSHA OSHA acquired acquired informa tion tion on on compliance compliance for for all all q " rules rules i', = penalty penalty in in dollars dollars for for violation violation of of rule rule i, i. for for i= I, 2. ..., ,I represent all all other other costs costs that that may may be be incurred incurred by by a a firm firm subject subject to to inspection. inspection. While While these these parameters parameters may may represent represent many many ditTerent types types diRerent of of costs. we we confine confine our our discussion discussion to to the the impact impact of of costs, inspection inspection on on workers' wagc:s. While workers workers are are considered considered safety-conscious, safety-conscious, they they do do not not possess possess perfect perfect information information on on the the various various risk risk characteristics characteristics workers' wages. Whiie associated associated with with alternative alternative emple-yments, and and market market emplqments.
wages wages do do not not reflect perfect perfect compensation compensation for for occup ational ational risk. risk. OSHA OSHA may may increase increase information information on on risk risk retlect occupto to workers workers through through its its identification of ofnoncomplying noncomplying firms, firms, which which would would increase increase market market wages wages and and the the identiIication costs costs of of the the firm firm as as well. well. But But the the degree degree of of identifi cation cation depends depends on on the the characteristics characteristics of of the the rule rule set set identifithat that OSHA OSHA enforces enforces on on firms. firms. There There is is l"vidence that that evidence OSHA's enforcement enforcement program program is is not not aimed aimed at at dis seminating seminating mformation IOformation on on previously previously unperceived unperceived been OSHA's disrisks risks to to workers workers and and that that consequently consequently it it has has not not heen sU<X.'essful .,t increasing increasing worker's compensation compensation for for (2) defines the the expected expected loss loss facing facing firms firms in in noncompliance noncompliance in in a a time time period period that that had had not not been been previously previously inspected inspected in in a a given given jurisdiction. jurisdiction. It It is is this this cost cost that that firms firms weigh weigh against against the the returns returns from from alternative alternative investments. investments. Assume Assume there there is is an an alternative investment investment the the size size of of the the outlay outlay necessary necessary for for compliance compliance with with OSHA OSHA rules rules in in a a given given period. period. If If the the return return on on this this alternative alternative investment investment is is greater greater than than E(L) E(L) in in the the same same period, period, the the firm firm does does not not invest invest in in corrective corrective activity. activity. But But if ifE(L) E(L) is is greater greater than than the the alternative alternative return, return, the the firm firm does does altema?ive invest invest in in corrective corrective activity. activity. If Ifa a firm is is inspected inspected in in the the Iirm policy policy period, period, the the penalties penalties )'i are are the the expected expected costs costs of of noncompliance noncompliance with with each each penalized penalized violation. violation. yi THE THE ENFORCEMENT ENFORCEMENT PROGRAMS PROGRAMS OF OF OSHA OSHA The The Initial Initial Inspection Program Program lmpecth The The value value of of E(L) E(L) is is estimated estimated in in the the following following 7 manner. manner. 'I Fiscal Fiscal 1977 1977 is is the the policy policy period period within within which which estimates estimates are are made. made. The The probability probability of of initial initial inspection inspection IX is is estimated estimated by by dividing dividing the the number number of of initial initial inspections inspections by by the the number number of of regulated regulated firms. firms. deviations deviations away away from from the the mean mean is is 0.0027. 0.0027. In In terms terms of of the the loss loss parameters parameters E(LI this this corresponds corresponds to to a a limit limit of of E(L) -$12.42 to to $20.22. These These estimates estimates suggest suggest that that the the The data data in in Table  Table   52 Haads ( 1374. 8) The data data in in Table  Table 2 2 indicate indicate that that firms firms that that were were initially initially inspected inspected but but not not reinspected reinspected were were likely likely have chosen siilbz invest-to to haw f'ltosen alternative alternative investments investments since invest ments ments in in correction correction yielded yielded noncompetitive noncompetitive rates rates of of reinspection return. return. The The reinspection program program had had the the likely likely effect effect of ofexerting exerting an an insignificant insignificant from from zero zero impact impact upon upon the the resource resource allocations allocations of of firms firms that that were were in-initially initially in spected spected but but not not reinspected reinspected during during this this period. period.
' SesLccupnond

penalties yR,
If If a a firm firm is is reinspected, reinspected, the the penalties}' Iti become become the the expected expected costs costs for for each each violation violation cited cited and and penalized. penalized. By By multiplying multiplying the the average average number number of of violations violations per per reinspection reinspection by by the the average average penalty. penalty, the the cost cost of of 
